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Preserving the Corporate Tax Base Through Tax
Transparency
by Henry Ordower
When, where, and at what rate to tax the incomeof business entities are the fundamental ques-
tions for the corporate income tax. Answers to those
questions should remain independent of the taxpayer’s
choice of business form, because one may achieve
identical revenue outcomes with entity opacity or trans-
parency. When the answers to those questions vary
with business form and tax system structure, opportu-
nities to arbitrage those differences across national bor-
ders and diminish or avoid tax on the corporate in-
come inevitably emerge.
Tax professionals, administrators, academics, econo-
mists, and business participants may and often do dis-
agree on whether a corporation’s (or other business
entity’s) income from the operation of its business
should be taxable to the corporation itself or taxable to
its owners. Opinions also may diverge on whether to
tax investment income differently from income from
the operation of a business. Despite those disagree-
ments, as long as there is to be an income tax,1 all will
agree that the choice of one business form over an-
other should not result in income from business opera-
tions escaping income tax completely.
Similarly, income should be subject to tax primarily
where the taxpayer produces income from the opera-
tion of a business. Taxing income where the taxpayer’s
principal office or seat of management happens to be
makes sense only under a system that taxes residents
and citizens on their worldwide incomes (a global
model of taxation like the United States has) and then
only secondarily to the place of income production in
order to prevent taxpayers from gaining an advantage
by placing their income in low-tax jurisdictions.2 Those
jurisdictions that tax resident corporations on their
worldwide incomes cede primary taxing authority to
the jurisdiction where the taxpayer produces income.3
Determining where the taxpayer produces income often
1Proposals to substitute a consumption tax for an income tax
are common, and it is possible that in the future an income tax
may no longer exist.
2Agreement as to location emerges fairly clearly from the
common consolidated corporate tax base (CCCTB) proposal. See
European Commission, Brussels, COM(2011) 121/4, 2011/0058
(CNS), Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consoli-
dated Corporate Tax Base (2011) at 14 (CCCTB proposal), avail-
able at http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/
documents/taxation/company_tax/common_tax_base/
com_2011_121_en.pdf.
3For example, the U.S. allows a credit against the corpora-
tion’s U.S. tax for the tax paid in the jurisdiction of production.
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is challenging because intellectual property may be in
one location, factories in a second location, service
employees in a third location, sales in a fourth, and all
contribute to the production of the taxpayer’s income.4
This article argues that a wholly transparent income
tax system would improve existing corporate tax sys-
tems and establish tax neutrality between entities cur-
rently subject to the corporate income tax and those
that are not. Full transparency is consistent with inter-
national treaty obligations and simultaneously elimi-
nates many international tax arbitrage opportunities.
Business needs rather than tax benefits would drive
choice of business form. If accompanied by a robust
system of international apportionment of business in-
come,5 a fully transparent corporate income tax would
eliminate most income allocation arbitrage as well as
tax system structure arbitrage opportunities.
Some History
No universal international standard for imposition
of the corporate income tax exists. Two often converg-
ing lines of argument for an entity-level tax emerge:
• limited liability; and
• separate personality.
Internationally, limited liability is a key factor, and,
consistent with that argument, several developed coun-
tries even impose a corporate income tax on limited
partners’ shares of limited partnership income but not
on the general partners’ shares. Developed countries
tend to have one or more types of tax transparent enti-
ties, including something comparable to a general part-
nership.
The concepts of separate personality and limited
liability led many jurisdictions to tax corporations at
rates consistent with individual income tax rates. When
the corporations distributed their earnings to their own-
ers, the owners would include the distributions as divi-
dends in their individual incomes subject to the own-
ers’ individual income tax rates. Separation of the
entity from its owners for tax purposes caused the ag-
gregate tax on corporate earnings to combine the two
levels of tax. If, for example, the maximum income tax
rate for all taxpayers was 50 percent, the total tax on
distributed corporate earnings would be 75 percent —
that is, 50 percent at corporate level and 50 percent of
the remaining 50 percent (after corporate tax) at share-
holder level. This full two-level tax is less common to-
day than it was several decades ago.
In the 1940s, objections to the full two levels of tax
began to emerge. Objectors sought with some success
to characterize the corporate tax system as unjustifiable
double taxation. Despite the corporation’s separate per-
sonality, it seemed indisputable that the corporate own-
ers economically bore the corporate tax in addition to
the shareholder tax so that integration of corporate
and shareholder taxes on corporate earnings became
compelling. Increasingly, however, economic models
identify a shift of the incidence of some or all the cor-
porate tax to labor through lower wages and consumers
through higher prices. Even the staunchest proponents
of full separate taxes concede that relief from multiple
impositions of the corporate-level tax through chains of
corporations is desirable. Consolidated returns of in-
come for groups of related corporations and dividend
relief for distributions from corporations to corporate
owners of their shares have become common.
More recently some countries (with the United
States in the lead) began to de-link the concepts of
separate personality and limited liability. Limited liabil-
ity ceased to be determinative of tax opacity. Rather,
public trading of ownership interests signaled separate-
ness of personality, so that public companies remained
opaque while many closely held businesses became tax
transparent (or the owners could elect transparency for
the company).
Increasing economic globalization and aggressive
tax planning exert continuous downward pressure on
corporate income tax rates. Capital mobility creates the
perception that business owners will shift their corpo-
rate income to jurisdictions with favorable corporate
tax systems unless the home jurisdiction decreases
rates. To remain competitive, nations have adopted a
variety of strategies to combat loss of tax revenue to
lower tax jurisdictions. Many countries have reduced
the corporate rate from individual rate levels to corpo-
rate rates that are half or less than half of maximum
individual rates. Others have adopted systems of low
rates for businesses with the greatest mobility while
retaining higher rates for businesses requiring large in-
frastructure investments. Some countries even have re-
duced the corporate rate to zero and increased indi-
vidual rates or shifted the tax burden to consumption
taxes (like the VAT) to offset lost corporate revenues.
Reducing corporate rates would make tax policy
sense without jeopardizing tax collection if the
individual-level tax would follow closely on the
corporate-level tax. Corporations always have had the
opportunity to defer the individual-level taxes by retain-
ing earnings rather than distributing dividends. Often
4The CCCTB proposal addresses the location problem
through formulary apportionment of business income.
5See CCCTB proposal. For discussions of worldwide formu-
lary apportionment, see Julie Roin, ‘‘Can the Income Tax Be
Saved? The Promise and Pitfalls of Adopting Worldwide Formu-
lary Apportionment,’’ 61 Tax L. Rev. 169 (2008); Reuven S. Avi-
Yonah, Kimberly A. Clausing, and Michael C. Durst, ‘‘Allocat-
ing Business Profits for Tax Purposes: A Proposal to Adopt a
Formulary Profit Split,’’ 9 Fla. Tax. Rev. 497 (2009); Susan C.
Morse, ‘‘Revisiting Formulary Apportionment,’’ 29 Va. Tax. Rev.
593 (2010); Henry Ordower, ‘‘Utopian Visions Toward a Grand
Unified Global Income Tax,’’ 14 Fla. Tax Rev. (forthcoming
2013), Saint Louis U. Legal Studies Research Paper 2012-32,
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2182866.
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shareholders can convert the deferred income into capi-
tal gain taxed at preferred rates of tax in many jurisdic-
tions. Corporate income frequently becomes subject to
combined corporate and individual rates significantly
lower than the individual rate on business income. In
those instances, corporate operating form has a tax ad-
vantage over noncorporate operating form that is diffi-
cult to justify.
Corporate-Shareholder Integration
Whether the theoretical underpinnings for two-level
taxes on corporate earnings are sound or not, two-level
tax structures have become obsolete. Continuing to im-
pose a high corporate rate may drive businesses to
lower-tax jurisdictions. Even if high rates do not moti-
vate choice of business location on any significant
scale, political rhetoric has done much to persuade the
public that the corporate rate is too high — out of line
with competitive corporate rates. Political assertions
similarly may persuade the public that double taxation
of corporate earnings is unjust, impractical, and un-
competitive even if untrue. Substitution of a single-
level income tax on corporate earnings may become
necessary to protect the corporate income tax as a rev-
enue source and may be more efficient in the current
political climate than a two-level tax.
Proposals to integrate corporate and shareholder
taxes have taken at least four forms:
• corporate deduction for dividends paid to make
the selection of debt or equity capital tax neutral;
• imputation systems providing a shareholder credit
for the corporate tax (advance corporate tax);
• reduced or zero tax rate on shareholders’ receipt
of dividends through an exclusion of the amount
of dividends the taxpayer receives or a deduction
for all or part of those dividend amounts; or
• tax transparency of the entity.
Each integration method is imperfect, but the full
transparency model with collection of tax at entity
level, despite its complexity, seems least likely to en-
counter legal barriers in the European Union and pos-
sibly other regions.
Deductibility of dividends establishes neutrality be-
tween debt capital and equity capital. The current dis-
tinction between deductible interest and nondeductible
dividends has long generated a bias toward debt financ-
ing. There are, however, real risk differences and bur-
dens that distinguish debt from equity. Entities must
meet their debt obligations, so that the obligation to
pay interest burdens the entity and limits the entity’s
free use of its debt capital. Debt also enjoys a general
priority over equity capital on termination of the enti-
ty’s life, but debt generally does not participate in the
entity’s growth. Those distinctions between debt and
equity reflect themselves in accounting rules and entity
valuation. While debt and equity have differing posi-
tions on an ownership continuum so that as one
changes the characteristics of the specific debt issue, it
comes to resemble equity ever more and vice versa. Yet
historical tax differences between debt and equity may
prove difficult to overcome.
Probably more important is current double tax
treaty practice, which tends to shift the location of in-
come from the producing country to the investing
country. The common practice of reducing the with-
holding rate on cross-border payments of interest and
dividends often results in deductible payments reducing
the tax in the jurisdiction of the entity’s operation and
shifting the inclusion to the country where the capital
provider is located. Sometimes that dividend and inter-
est income does not incur a tax in any jurisdiction.
Deductibility of dividends also would exacerbate the
existing problem of deductible payments to tax-exempt
organizations that currently allow much corporate op-
erating income to escape tax through the deduction.
The imputation system for integration was popular
in Europe until the European Court of Justice held
that the shareholder’s residence jurisdiction had to
grant a credit for taxes paid by a foreign corporation
that distributed a dividend to a resident shareholder
even though the resident jurisdiction received no part
of the corporate tax paid.6 Because imputation systems
used a credit for corporate taxes paid, those systems
avoided the problem of tax-exempt shareholders that
had no tax against which to claim the credit.
Few jurisdictions continue to impose both corporate-
and shareholder-level taxes without rate concessions
relative to other sources of income. Many jurisdictions
impose a lower rate on corporate dividends and gain
from the sale of corporate shares than on other types
of income, so that there is partial integration in the
form of a full corporate-level tax followed by a reduced
shareholder-level tax. Other jurisdictions have reduced
both the corporate-level tax and the shareholder-level
tax to balance the sum of the two to be more or less
the same together as one full single-level tax.
Assume that Jurisdiction X considers 50 percent to
be the ideal tax rate for all income. It could impose a
50 percent tax on entity-level income for all entities
and allow those entities to distribute their profits freely
and without further tax to their owners. This is a
simple solution. The entity bears the tax burden and
pays the tax when and where it earns the income. The
recommendation in this commentary adopts a variant
on this structure.
The combined forces of international tax competi-
tion and capital mobility, however, make it necessary
to reduce the entity-level tax in order to prevent capital
6Petri Manninen (C-319/02), [2004] ECR I-7477, available at
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/showPdf.jsf ?text=&docid=49454
&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part
=1&cid=622015.
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flight to lower-tax jurisdictions. Assume that interna-
tional competitive norm limits the entity rate to 25 per-
cent. The owner-level tax must increase to 33.3 percent
to capture the aggregate ideal 50 percent tax.7 While
the possibility of reaching the ideal tax inheres, the
outcome is less desirable and certain. The method de-
fers the owner-level tax until the entity distributes its
income. Part of the tax may elude Jurisdiction X if
some of its owners are not subject to tax in the juris-
diction because they are exempt from tax or are non-
resident. For nonresidents, a 33.3 percent withholding
tax on entity distributions might gain the tax revenue
but current treaty practice precludes such a high with-
holding tax on distributions.
Tax transparency offers the most efficient and palat-
able solution to the one-level tax rate conundrum by
locating and taxing income where the taxpayer pro-
duces it without violating treaty obligations. This pro-
posal is discussed in the next section.
Recommendation
Tax transparency forestalls tax competition by set-
ting the nominal corporate income tax rate at zero as
imputation systems effectively did. The corporation
acts in a manner analogous to a withholding agent for
its owners by paying the maximum shareholder tax on
the entity’s income on behalf of its shareholders when
and where the entity earns the income. Regardless of
their countries of residence, shareholders would in-
clude in their individual incomes their shares of the
entity’s income as if they received the income directly
from the source, in the manner, and at the time the
corporation received the income.8
Under a full transparency system, each underlying
shareholder (through layers of corporations, if neces-
sary) would be engaged in the corporation’s business in
the taxing jurisdiction but only to the extent of the
shareholder’s portion of the corporation’s income. Un-
like imputation systems, the shareholder would not
receive a dividend from the corporation the tax on
which the shareholder could offset with the corporate
tax paid. The shareholder would be primarily liable for
the tax on corporate income and receive a credit for
the entity-level payment (or withholding) from the tax-
ing jurisdiction against his individual income tax pay-
able in the jurisdiction where the corporation earned
the income.
Nonresident shareholders would not have to file an
income tax return in the taxing jurisdiction but would
receive no withholding credit if they did not file.
Shareholders could file a return of income in the tax-
ing jurisdiction on their shares of the corporation’s in-
come in that jurisdiction and receive a credit for the
entity tax payment against the tax determined on that
return. To ensure collection of a tax on all operating
income of the corporation, tax-exempt shareholders
would be taxable on their shares of the corporation’s
operating income even if the shareholders are exempt
from tax on income from other sources.
This transparency system should not run afoul of
the imputation decisions of the ECJ9 because it treats
all shareholders equally, regardless of residence, by im-
puting the entity’s business and location to all owners.
Losses may prove more of a challenge. If the entity
incurs a loss, the system would have to limit the de-
ductibility of the loss for both resident and nonresident
owners to income from that entity’s business in the
taxing jurisdiction, a carryover system, to remain per-
missible under ECJ case law.
Under this transparency recommendation, liquidity
is not a problem as it is for many minority owners of
existing transparent entities. In existing transparent en-
tities, minority owners sometimes must depend on the
cooperation, and even beneficence, of the controlling
owners to distribute enough cash to enable the minor-
ity owners to pay tax on their shares of the entities’
incomes. Under this recommendation, the entity pays
the tax for its owners, who may or may not claim the
credit. Troubling for some taxpayers, however, may be
the disclosure of beneficial ownership necessary to tax
the underlying owners on their shares of the corpora-
tion’s income — a secrecy concern. Compulsory dis-
closure of beneficial ownership is a growing interna-
tional trend, as jurisdictions seek to prevent their
taxpayers from hiding investments outside their home
jurisdictions.
Nevertheless, owners concerned about ownership
secrecy could choose not to include the income from
the corporation and, in the case of a corporation in
another jurisdiction, not file a return in that jurisdic-
tion. Since the corporation has ‘‘withheld’’ at the high-
est individual rate, the jurisdiction in which the corpo-
ration earns its income loses no tax revenue.10
In the presence of widely dispersed ownership inter-
ests, active trading of interests, and frequent presence
of indirect ownership, transparency becomes compli-
cated. Allocating entity income among an ever-
changing pool of shareholders requires adoption of
various income accrual conventions such as allocation
of all annual income evenly on an hourly or daily own-
ership basis. Computer technology should be equal to a
7That is 25 percent of income, plus one-third of the remain-
ing 75 percent of the entity’s income.
8Compare section 702(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of the
United States (1986) (imputing the source and character of a
partnership’s income to its partners).
9See Petri Manninen (C-319/02).
10Ultimately, secrecy of beneficial ownership is likely to yield
to the needs of administering a global income tax. See supra note
5.
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challenge of this computational complexity — technol-
ogy already manages allocations in the gargantuan mu-
tual fund industry.
Preference for debt financing will worsen under a
full transparency system unless the shift to transpar-
ency carries debt along and treats debt holders as it
does shareholders. Alternatively, the tax system could
recharacterize the ownership of debt as doing business
where the debtor uses the borrowed funds. Or the cor-
porate operating jurisdiction could impose withholding
tax at the source on interest paid equal to the indi-
vidual rate of tax and not allow treaty reductions in
that rate.
Continuing Capital Flight
Full transparency does not eliminate the problem of
capital flight. The CCCTB proposal11 may diminish the
capital competition problem within the European
Union insofar as shifting the place of the corporation’s
management will not necessarily shift its income. How-
ever, the CCCTB proposal may be only a first step in
development of a worldwide system to apportion busi-
ness income (or all income) and permit jurisdictions to
set rates rationally without concern of capital flight.12◆
11See supra note 2.
12See supra note 5.
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